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RULE OF MAN VS.
THE AMERICAN MINING LAWS:
THE PERSECUTION AND ELIMINATION
OF THE SMALL MINER ON
PUBLIC LANDS IN THE UNITED STATES

HALE

C.

TOGNONI*

I. INTRODUCTION
Rule of man in the public land agencies of the United State.
has become a despotism called administrative law. No longei
limited by the Constitution or the doctrine of due process.
administrative law in agencies with power over public land ha,
quashed the property rights of the mining claim locator in
deference to the encroachments of alternative public land users.
Administrative law has denied any value to a mineral prospect,
imposed large company economics on the successful mining
operations of lone miners and their families, and made a mockery
of mining knowledge and mining law.
The property rights of the mining claim locator are common
law rights of the most basic sort which Congress enacted' as the
American Mining Laws in 1872.1 These laws proceeded from the
idea that the public domain belonged to the people and that the
mineral was to be privately acquired as a reward for discovery,
occupation and development work. From that premise the
adventurers who invaded California in 1849, seeking gold and
* Consulting mining engineer and practicing attorney specializing in miinig law in Phoenix.
Arizona. B.S., 1948, University of Nevada. Mckav School of Mines: LL.B., 1953, J.D., 1969,
University of Idaho. The authot acknovsledges ,ith 'thanks the contribution of Becky Lou Boudway
in the preparation of this article.
1. An Act to promote the Development of the mining resouLces of the United States, ch. 152. 17
Stat. 91 (1872) (current version at 30 U.S.C. ch. 2 (1970)).
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seizing a lawless territory, necessarily adopted certain rules to bring
order. So well did their laws make order and aid in accomplishing
the task of finding and developing the country's minerals that those
rules became models for mining districts all over the public
domain, 2 and the United States became a formidable mineral
power indebted to their effectiveness.
Although many millions of acres remain open to mineral entry
under the mining laws, stockraisers, land developers, "environmentalists," and a greedy government are slowly erasing
the small mineral developer from the land. The administrative
regulation being used in the land agencies does not recognize the
legal property rights of the mining claim locator or even attempt
token compensation to a claim locator when other more powerful
non-mineral appropriators or government departments desire the
public domain. In effect the American mining laws have been
revoked, not by Congress, but by what this writer calls the "rule of
man," that is, whichever man controls the Forest Service and the
Bureau of Land Management. Congress, largely via the MultipleUse Sustained-Yield Act ofJune 12, 1960, 3 and the courts, via tacit
acceptance of limited judicial review, 4 have surrendered their
constitutional powers and duties to agencies which have been
slowly prosecuting, convicting and eliminating mining claim
prospectors and the men who attempt to live under the mining
laws.
The administrative law courts, entrusted to land agencies
because of their supposed expertise in matters of mineral
development, have made due process virtually inaccessible to the
average citizen or mining claim locator. The courts and Congress
have been so successfully bypassed by means of these
administrative courts that the Solicitor for the Department of the
Interior, sworn to administer the law, openly admits that he will do
everything in his power to change the mining laws. He would
propose that some form of leasing similar to that now governing oil,
gas and some non-metallic minerals would be a superior system.'
In view of shortages and foreign dependencies recent to both oil
and gas, it is not unreasonable to question the agency's supposed
expertise in these matters.
2. G. COSTIAN, HANDBOOK ON AMERICAN MINING LAN V 2 (1908).
3. Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § § 528-29 (1970).
4. Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'don other grounds, 390 U.S. 599
(1968).
5. Address by Leo M. Krulitz, Solicitor for Department of Interior, Northwest Mining
Association 84th Annual Convention (Dec. 1, 1978) "Hard Rock Mineral Policy in the Carter
Administration." See Address by Keith R. Knoblock, spokesman for American. Mining Congress,
Northwest Mining Association 84th Annual Convention (Dec. 1, 1978) (Knohlock stated, "The
repeal ofthe mining law is a major goal for the Carter Administration." Krulitz did not protest).
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The incentive system in the American Mining Law recognizes
that prospecting and mining is a gambler's work. In fact, it is
frequently the case that more money has gone into exploration for
and development of any particular mineral than has been extracted
in mineral wealth in this country. 6 By nature, developing a mine is
a gambler's business for which scientists can only contribute
probability, not certainty. Almost every existing mine in this
country has been built on a prospector's perseverance and on trust
in the mining laws by a multitude of less successful prospectors.
In the early days of the law, the prospector and his finance, or
grubstake, could rely on his government to allow the law to
function. When the railroads and highway builders moving across
the country attempted to devalue the mineral prospector's work
and worth, they were stopped in the courts by the mining law
because the courts were still then available to the miner and
prospector. Years of administrative procedure and expense did not
intervene, and the uncertainty of the value of mining land did not.
deprive it of a value. 7 When the powerful railroads attempted to
take the prospector's claim with no compensation, due process, in
which a jury of the claimant's peers could hear the facts and
evaluate his good faith, was still available to a mining claim locator.
Today the government and its land agencies hire a bevy of
geologists and other experts whose jobs depend on their agreement
with agency intent and policy. It has been their job to deride the
prudence of the miner and prospector and to contradict the
opinions of mining men and scientists who say the challenged
prospector or miner has a discovery of value. The pivotal issue is no
longer the claimant's good faith but an evaluation of his discovery.
This is because the land agencies cannot hire an expert in divining
the intentions of a man, making bad faith hard to 'prove. As a result
the term "discovery" has been masticated by the lawyers while the
issue of good faith has gone unchallenged and conclusively
presumed against the mining claim locator, denying him due
8
process .
II. MINERAL DISCOVERY
The sole statutory authority for mining claims is that "all
valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States..
6. H. Tognoni, Capital Return or Lcgislauivc Gracu 15 (1952) (University of Idaho graduate
research study printed by Hecla Mining Company).
7. Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 352-53 (1890). See a1so J. ADAMS & D.
BARRINGER, T

F LAW OF MINES ANI) MINING, IN TiHE UNITrH STAT-S 188 (1900).

8. Zeigler v. South & North Ala. R.R. Co., 58 Ala. 594, 599 (1877).
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shall be free and open to exploration and purchase. . . . ,9 The
earliest articulate case interpretation of the words "valuable
mineral deposits" in this statute is Book v. Justice Mining Co. 10
Experts testified at length that the cost of removal of porphyry
copper was too high to allow the ore to be marketed at a profit. The
court, however, held the discovery to be good and explained its
disregard for the expert testimony by posing the following
hypothetical case:
A vein or lode of quartz or other rock in place, bearing
gold and silver, is found upon the side of a hill or
mountain. It is within well-defined walls, and the rock
assays from $1 to $15 per ton. The cost of extracting,
removing and milling the ore is $20 per ton. The miner
making the discovery is aware of this fact but he knows or
has good reason to believe from his own knowledge,
gained by years of experience, that, within or along the
veins or lodes of that particular district, places are liable
to be found that may prove to be of much greater value,
and that the ore is liable to be richer at a greater depth
than it is upon the surface. Now, in such a case, can it be
reasonably claimed, under the provisions of the mining
laws, that a person making the discovery - a discovery
which, in good faith, induces him to locate the vein or
lode, and to commence the running of a tunnel into the
hill or mountain for the purpose of properly working and
developing the ground, and complying with all of the
provisions of the law, after he has expended thousands of
dollars in labor and improvements upon the same - can
be deprived of his location by the fact that other persons,
subsequent to his discovery and to his location, went
upon the hill 500 or 1,000 feet distant from the place
where he had found and prospected the lode, but within
the limits of his location, and there, by sinking a deeper
shaft upon the same lode, found ore which assayed over
$40 per ton, - enough to insure a profit to the owners and thereupon located the ground? This may be an
extreme case, but it fairly illustrates the theory, for,
according to the testimony of several of complainants'
witnesses, the latter location would be valid, and the prior
9. Mineral Lands & Mining, 30 U.S.C. § 22(1970).
10. 58 F. 106 (C.C.D. Nev. 1893).
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location invalid. The act of congress is not susceptible of any
such construction. It does not impose any conditions as to the value
or the extent of the ore. It simply provides that "no location of
a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of a vein
or lode within the limits of the claim located.""
The next noteworthy decision defining necessary discovery
was Castle v. Womble.12 The "prudent man test" therein has been
followed by the Supreme Court in numerous decisions' 3 and has
become the settled law of the land. The customary quote in citing
Castle v. Womble defines discovery as being "where minerals have
been found and the evidence is of such a character that a person of
ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of
his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in
developing a valuable mine.' ' 4 The foregoing quote is lifted,
however, from a paragraph which goes on to say as follows:

to hold otherwise would tend to make of little avail, if not
entirely nugatory, that provision of the law whereby "all
valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
United States. . .are. . . declared to be free and open to
exploration and purchase." For, if as soon as minerals are
shown to exist, and at any time during exploration,
before the returns become renumerative, the lands are to
be subject to other disposition, few would be found
willing to risk time and capital in an attempt to bring to
light and make available the mineral wealth, which lies
concealed in the bowels of the earth, as Congress
obviously must have intended the explorers should have
5
proper opportunity to do. 1
This caution in Castle v. Womble is left out of current citations
of the "prudent man test." The administrative courts have
forgotten it. Decisions of these courts and the policy which controls
them would be in direct conflict with decisions using the "prudent
man test" as it was intended. One court stated:
11.Book v.Justice Miningio., 58 F.106. 124-25 (C.C.D.Nev. 1893). (emphasis added).
12. Castle v.Wornble. 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 455 (1894).
13. E.g.,Cameron v. United States. 252 U.S. 450 (1920): Chrisman \-.Miller. 197 U.S. 313
(1905).
14. 19 Pub. Lands Dec. at 457.
15. Id.
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[In] respect to placer claims, if a competent locator
actually finds upon unappropriated
public land
petroleum or other mineral in or upon the ground, and so
situated as to constitute a part of it, it is a sufficient
discovery, within the meaning of the statute, to justify a
location under the law without waiting to ascertain
whether the ground contained the mineral in sufficient
16
quantities to pay.

The prudent man test has been stated by another court as
follows:
In a case where the question of discovery is directly
involved, all that is necessary for the locator to show is
that he has made such a discovery as would justify a
reasonably prudent person in the expenditure of money
and labor in developing the claim with the reasonable
expectation of finding minerals in paying quantities. 17
In further recognition of the uncertainties inherent to mineral
discovery, the government once took into consideration not only
the mineral found, but other important factors: whether the land is
within an established mining district; its proximity to working
mines; geological conditions; verification by experienced miners
and geologists; and good faith. 1 8 All of these factors have been
supplanted by what has become known as the "marketability test."
III. MARKETABILITY OF A MINERAL DISCOVERY
If a locator's claim is challenged today by the Forest Service or
by the Bureau of Land Management, he stands little chance of
seeing his claim judged by common law standards for discovery.
Instead he must fight years of administrative law .battles with
agencies which insist that his claim pass the marketability test. In
U. S. v. Coleman, 19 the Supreme Court calls the marketability test a
refinement of the prudent man test. But the use to which the
administrative courts have put this test goes far beyond the sanction
and intent of the Supreme Court in Coleman. While giving approval
16. Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co., 98 F. 673, 676 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1899).
17. United States v. Pan Am. Petroleum Co., 45 F.2d 821, 831 (S.D. Cal. 1930). See, e.g., I
AMERICAN LAW Or MININC S 4.26 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. ed., 1977).
18. 45 F.2d at 830.
19. 390 U.S. 599, 603 (1968).
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to the administrative test, the Supreme Court in that case also
recognized that the marketability test was not necessary to all
mineral discoveries.
[We] think that the Court of Appeals' objection to the
marketability test on the ground that it involves the
imposition of a different and more onerous standard on
claims for minerals of widespread occurence than for
rarer minerals which have generally been dealt with
under the prudent-man test is unwarranted. As we have
pointed

out.

.

.

the

prudent-man

test

and

the

marketability test :are not distinct standards, but are
complementary in that the latter is a refinement of the
former. While it is true that the marketability test is
usually the critical factor in cases involving nonmetallic
minerals of widespread occurrence [i.e., common
varieties], this is accounted for by the perfectly natural
reason that precious metals which are in small supply and
for which there is a great demand, sell at a price so high as
to leave little room to doubt that they can be extracted
20
and marketed at a profit.

While Coleman recognizes the marketability test, it also
recognizes the limitations of that test. As criteria for judging
discoveries of common varieties of mineral (which had to be
patentable by July 23, 1955, when common varieties could no
longer be located under the mining laws) the marketability test is
within the bounds of common law tests for mineral discovery. In
Coleman the Supreme Court did not foresee or intend the use to
which the administrative courts have since put the marketability
test; nor, perhaps, did the Court understand the undesirable
consequences which that test had already had on small prospectors
and miners of the precious metals the Court thought natural causes
would exempt from the clench of marketability. Where Coleman
cleared from the land a claimant who had spent thousands of
dollars building a home on 720 acres of scenic national forest with
no economically feasible market for the common quartzite through
which he sought mineral patent, the land agencies have used that
same test to harass and eliminate bona fide mining claimants who,
unlike Alfred Coleman, were not seeking patent at all.
20. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 603 (1968).
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The marketability test was designed to administer the
Common Varieties Act of July 23, 1955.21 It was to curb use of the
general mining law by persons who were locating mining claims on
public land for purposes other than legitimate mining activity. The
act removed common types of sand, gravel and stone from the
coverage of the mining laws to place the disposition of such
materials under the Materials Act of 1947, providing for the sale of
the common varieties without disposing of the land on which they
were found. 22 The marketability test was not designed for the bona
fide small prospector and miner who is not even seeking patent. For
him, meeting the marketability test is normally outside the realm of
possibility. The marketability test as administered by the land
agencies does not comprehend that a claim may sustain just one
23
man working at mineral development.
The land agencies use the marketability test to invalidate and
avoid compensating 24 mining claimants of common and
uncommon varieties of mineral alike, of precious metals as well as
of non-metallic minerals whether those non-metallics be
widespread or uncommon in occurrence. Often the victims are
made prey to the marketability test by the fact that they are
exercising their legal right under the mining laws to maintain and
occupy a cabin 25 while they are engaged in the development or
mining of the mineral which led them to locate their mining
26
claims.
The small miner or locator is most often the marketability
test's victim due to a common government practice of
accommodating the marginal mining claims of large mining
companies with land trades. Through this means the wealthy
21. 30 U.S.C. §5611-15(1971).
22. H. R. RFP. No. 730, 84TH CONG., IST SpSS., reprinted in [1955] U. S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 2478.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, A-30820 (I.D., Jan. 29, 1968); United States v.
Fairchild A-30803 (I.D., Jan. 19, 1968); United States v. Mosely, A-30791 (I.D., Dec. 13, 1967);
United States v. Edwards, 9 I.B.L.A. 197 (Jan. 29, 1973).
24. United States v. Boyle, 519 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1975). Ignoring pre-1955 production and an
obvious market, the claims were ruled invalid because the mineral was found to be a common variety
in land agency hearings. Runways at Williams Air Force Base had been built with decomposed
granite from the Boyle claims prior to 1955. At the hearing, the government mineral examiner stated
that the Forest Service would sell the material itself after the defendants were removed. See also
United States v. Johnson, I.B.L.A. 78-507 (Feb. 28, 1979) (prior to the complaint against a part of
the discovery, a highway department sales agreement had been negotiated with the claimants); Flood
Control Dist. of Maricopa County v. Melluzzo, Civ. No. 345729 (Super. Ct. Maricopa County,
Ariz., filed Feb. 7, 1977) (lode claims), and Civ. No. 345728 (Super. Ct. Maricopa County Ariz.,
filed Feb. 7, 1977) (placer claims).
25. See Valcalda v. Silver Peak Mines, 86 F. 90 (9th Cir. 1898). See also A. MORRISON, MINING
RIGHTS ON THE P1 ILiC DOMAIN 294-95 (16th ed., 1936).
26. See generally cases cited Note 23 supra. The Forest Service bulldozed Fairchild's cabin and
burned Mosely's cabin. Mosely sued for damages and the Forest Service paid because his cabin was
not on the invalidated claim. Mosely v. Brewer, Civ. No. 1205-PCT (Dist. Ct. Yavapai County,
Ariz., filed Nov. 4, 1970) (settled Jan. 4, 1971).
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mining company, which the government threatens with costly
challenges in the administrative courts, may buy up private lands
in areas where a land agency seeks to consolidate its ownership and
27
trade them for patent on the desired public lands.
IV. THE UNSPOKEN ISSUE OF GOOD FAITH
Most of the mining claim challenges brought by government
agencies are against claims for which the locator does not yet seek
patent or exclusive title. In such cases the proceedings are of
questionable legal significance. Such challenges fail to quash the
pedis possessio rights of the claimant who is proceeding in good faith.
After a mining claim has been voided by a land agency, the
claimant is not barred by law from access and further exploration. 28
Under the mining laws a claimant's possessory right is untouchable
so long as he remains in good faith and performs the required
annual assessment work. Neither the questions of good faith nor
work performed, however, are usually in dispute in land agency
contests. Generally speaking, these contests against mining claim
discovery are simply government harassment sanctioned under
administrative law.
The classic case on the topic of pedis possessio or a mining
claimant's possessory rights is Union Oil Co. v. Smith. 29 In it the
Court makes the important distinction between a claimant seeking
exclusive title against the United States and the rights of a locator
who is exploring a claim in good faith but does not yet seek patent.
[It] is clear that in order to create valid rights or initiate a
title as against the United States a discovery of mineral is
essential. . . nevertheless, 5 2319 extends an express
invitation to all qualified persons to explore the
lands of the United States for valuable mineral deposits,
and this and the following sections hold out to one who
succeeds in making discovery the promise of a full
reward. Those who, being qualified, proceed in good
faith to make such explorations and enter peaceably upon
vacant lands of the United States for that purpose are not
treated as mere trespassers, but as licensees or tenants at
27. See generally Records of United States Forest Set-vice, Regional Office, Dept. of Agriculture,
Albuquerque, N.M. (Re: Tonto Nat. Forest, Pinto Valley operations of City Services, Miami,
Ariz.; Prescott Nat. Forest, Copper Basin operations of Phelps Dodge Corp., Prescott, Ariz.).
28. Barrows v. Hickel, 447 F.2d 80, 83 (9th Cir. 1971).
29. 249 U.S. 337 (1919).
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will. For since, as a practical matter, exploration must
precede the discovery of minerals, and some occupation
of the land ordinarily is necessary for adequate and
systematic exploration, legal recognition of the pedis
possessio of a bona fide and qualified prospector is
universally regarded as a necessity....
And it has come to be generally recognized that
while discovery is the indispensable fact and the marking
and recording of the claim dependent upon it, yet the
order of time in which these acts occur is not essential in
the acquisition from the United States of the exclusive
right of possession of the discovered minerals or the obtaining of a patent therefor, but that discovery may
follow after location and give validity to the claim as of the
time of discovery, provided no rights of third parties
intervened....
In the California courts the right of a locator before
discovery while in possession of his claim and prosecuting
exploration work is recognized as a substantial interest,
extending. not only as far as the pedis possessio but to the
limits of the claim as located; so that if a duly qualified
person peaceably and in good faith enters upon vacant
lands of the United States prior to discovery
but for the purpose of discovering oil or other valuable
mineral deposits, there being no valid mineral location
upon it, such person has the right to maintain possession
as against violent, fraudulent, and surreptitious
intrusions so long as he continues to occupy the land to
the exclusion of others and diligently and in good faith
prosecutes the work of endeavoring to discover mineral
thereon .... 30
United States v. Deasy31 is particularly germaine to pedis possessio
in the context of "rule of man" versus the mining laws. The court
held the possessory title to a mining claim good against
all-including the U.S.-as long as the locator complies with the
law. Contests initiated by the United States against unpatented
mining claims which, in good faith, have been maintained and
developed under the provisions of law cannot be challenged under
the rule of law for lack of economic discovery. If land agencies
30. Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1919).
31.24F. 108 (D. Idaho 1928).
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propose other uses than mining for the land, the only legal question
32
is how much to compensate the bona fide mining claimant.
The case, United States v. Crawford,33 however, is an instructive
example of the major ills which have befallen the mining laws. In
Crawford, the Forest Service requested a mineral examination
because Crawford was using the millsite to which he was entitled by
statute 34 "as a base of operations from which Mr. Crawford could
conduct his prospecting." ' 35 Mineral examination resulted in a
contest against one of Crawford's three lode mining claims and
against the millsite adjacent to it. Crawford could not prove that
the ore he had so far uncovered and, in fact, milled met the
standards of the marketability test and administrative law.
Geologists and mining experts testifying in his behalf supported his
prudence in following the vein, and they substantiated the fact that
mines with veins similar to Crawford's had led to large discoveries
and the development of paying mines in the vicinity. Predictably,
however, Crawford's discovery on the one lode claim was
invalidated.' Crawford appealed through the proper administrative
offices and then took his case to the courts. On May 10, 1971, the
Ninth Circuit found substantial evidence in the record to support
36
the ruling of the Secretary of the Interior on discovery.
Meanwhile Crawford still had his other two mining claims to
support his right to the millsite. Because the land remained open to
mineral entry, he also continued to prospect in the area of his
invalidated claim in accordance with his rights of pedis possesszo as a
mineral entryman in good faith. But on November 13, 1974, the
United States filed a suit in ejectment 37 against Crawford and a
motion for summary judgment claiming that Crawford was in bad
faith possession and use of the millsite. That motion was granted
even though there existed a genuine issue as to material fact on the
issue of bad faith, 38 and even though questions of intent are
inappropriate for summary judgment.3 9 -In an unrelated case, one
court has stated the rule as follows:
32. See generally cases cited in TH. LAW OF MiNES AND MINING IN THE UNIIrED) STATES supra note
7, at 188-93.
33. Civ. No. 74-753-PHX-WEC (D. Ariz., 1978).
34. Mineral Lands & Mining, 30 U.S.C. § 42(a) (1971). See also 30 U.S.C. § 612 which states
that "'[A mining claim] shall not be used, prior to the issuance of a patent therefor, for any purposes
other than prospecting, mining or processing operations and uses reasonably incident thereto."
35. Forest Service Trespass Report, United States v. Crawford, Civ. No. 74-753-PHX-WEC

(D. Ariz., 1978).
36. Mosely v. Hickel, 442 F.2d 1030, 1031 (9th Cir. 1971).
37. United States v. Crawford, Civ. No. 74-753-PHX-WEC (D. Ariz., 1978).
38. See, e.g., Dawn v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 358 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Red House v.
Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.) renandedon rehearing,523 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1975).
39. See Staren v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 529 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1976);
Fitsimmons v. Best, 528 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1976).
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[The] complaint presented questions of fact to be
determined by the trial court as to the good or bad faith of
the locator, in filing the mining claim, and the good or
bad faith of the possessor as to uses to which it was being
put and that these were evidentiary questions which the
district court had jurisdiction to decide, and should have
40
decided on a factual hearing.
Crawford could not afford to appeal the case, and was subsequently
evicted from the land.
V. A WRONG WITHOUT A REMEDY
It is widely supposed that decisions regarding mining claim
rights are of a technical nature. Yet "[the] standards to be applied
in determining what a prudent prospector would or would not do
are not those of a trained engineer or geologist and are not even
necessarily determined by the prudence of a skilled miner. "41
Nothing in the background and experience of the ordinary expert,
asked in land agency hearings to invalidate a claimant's discovery,
would give him any special knowledge of what a prospector of
ordinary prudence would or would not do in attempting to develop
a mine. The government expert's credentials as a scientist are
largely irrelevant to the legal issue, and the technicalities of science
are not pivotal considerations under the mining law. "The
definitions by the courts are not the definitions of geologists; and
the terms are to be considered as used in the signification which
they convey to the practical miner, and not in the sense generally
used by the scientific man. "42 Nonetheless, the overcrowded courts
resist hearing mining contests partly because the subject matter is
of a technical nature. Yet technical information and the evaluation
of it, in and of itself, will not necessarily dictate the decision made.
Meanwhile, experts for the government and for the claimant
sit in administrative hearings basically concurring on the factual
information of a technical nature. Their disagreements are on
issues of law and economic forecast 43 issues which, when
committed to administrative discretion, spell "rule of man" and
not "rule of law." The mining engineers and geologists hired by
the government are commonly asked if in their opinions the mining
40. U nited States %. Nogucira. 403 F.2d 816.823 (9th Cir. 1968).
41. Chrisinan %. Milet. 197 U.S. 313. 323 (1905).
42. Henderson \. Futon. 35 Pub. I.ands Dec. 652. 662 (1907)
43. So . . ultiplc
ts, Inc. \.Mo(rton. 504 1.2(1448 (9th (.1r. 1974).
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claimant could make a profit by mining the exposures found by
them. When the claim is still being explored or developed, the
government expert's answer is, of course, "No." He then offers
the legal opinion that there is no discovery on the claim. In one
recent case, a government expert went into a land agency hearing
prepared to offer that opinion with no experience in taking placer
samples. 44 Concerning marketability, opinions of men not in an
area until ten years after a crucial date have rebutted factual proof
45
of production and sales.
If a mining claimant has not given up hope during years in
administrative contest and appeal; if he has not been dismissed by
inability to pay a filing fee 46 or meet a filing date; 47 if he has not
been put out of business by ruthless land agency tactics; 48 and if he
has not been driven to distraction by some utterly impossible land
agency requirement, 49 he may finally see a court of law. The
courts, however, have deferred to the Department of Interior's
insistance that judicial review of Department decisions be limited.
Some years back.

.

.

it was broadly contended that the

Administrative Act does not apply to Decisions of the
Secretary of the Interior.

.

.

Next the Secretary has

argued that the determination of a question of fact by the
'Secretary of Interior, or his authorized representative, is
conclusive in the absence of fraud or imposition' and that
'decisions of the Secretary of Interior with respect to
public lands have historically been accorded a
conclusiveness beyond that of typical regulatory
agencies.' These are not the standards for review
44. United States v. Hett, No. 9848 (1. D., Ad. Law Judge, March 1, 1979) (joint sampling
ordered).
45. See United States v. Boyle, 519 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1975), United States s'.Johnson, I.B.L.A.
78-51)7 (Feb. 28, 1979).
46. United Statesv. Svnhad, I.B.L.A. 75-1011 (Feb. 25, 1976).
47. United States v. Haskins, 50.5 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1974).
41. ,ee United States v. McCormick. I.B.L.A. 72-216 (Sepl. 29, 1976). With neither miningnor
legal advice, a Forest Ranger decided the claims were null and void because the mineral was, in his
opinion, a common variety. He chained offaccess to the claims and interrupted the sale of material.
After land agency hearings, the material was ruled to be special and distinct under the provisions of
P'ublic Law 167, but the Forest Service appealed. For four years thereafter, while the case was in the
l)eparttent of Interior on appeal, the Forest Service attempted to influence McCormick's customers
against using his materials.
Se W.JM MINNG & Dv. Co., INc.
Mo'roN, Civ. No. 70-679 (I.D. July 31, 1969). United
States v. Melluzzo, 76 I.D. 181. Prior to hearing in the Bureau of Land Management, the
government succeeded in interfering with claimant's sales by telling customers that the company's
building stone was stolen. On record is a mineral examiner's threat to put that 'wop'
(Frank
Melluzzo of WJ M) back to washing windows.
49. See United States v. Brattain Contractors, Inc. I.B.L.A. 78-55 (Oct. 18, 1978). On five
miles of the Hassayampa River with documented gold content and production records, the
Department ruled that the owner has to have proof that the ancient locators, all dead, knew there was
gold there, or had made a discovery. Id.
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provided in the Administrative Procedure Act adopted in

1946 [5 U.S.C. 1009(e)]. 50
Abiding by the Department of Interior's wishes, the courts refuse
to grant trials de novo and confine themselves to considering whether
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the land
agency's invalidation. They regularly find that they "have no
51
warrant to review the evidence as to its weight and credibility. '
Consequently, meaningful review for the mining claimant is
virtually non-existent.
VI. RULE OF MAN
Will the "rule of man" and administrative law continue in the
direction which it has set for itself? Mineral wealth found and
developed by our forefathers has not yet been entirely liquidated, so
that the difficult decisions which man must make to survive can
successfully be postponed while man plays God. Today the policymakers are increasingly the environmentalists. If it can be fairly
said that the industrialists preceded them, then at least they did not
clothe themselves in self-righteousness; their weaknesses were of a
more earthly sort. Non-elective organizations like the Natural
Resources Defense Council (a group of lawyers) are increasingly
utilizing their powers in Washington, and directors of Sierra Club
legal defense have assumed official powers in the Department of the
Interior. 52 Both of these groups despise mining. The men of these
groups have been privileged to live on the land rather than from it.
Were the California prospectors and miners who originated
the mining laws clairvoyant in their distrust of lawyers? Those
miners proposed whipping and banishment as the punishment for
any man caught practicing the profession of law. The utopian
vision of these lawyers and lawmakers, if vision guides them, is
plain in the inescapable results of a new law with a section entitled
"Authorization to Sell Reserved Mineral Interests to Surface
Owners." ' 53 This authorization is a supposed solution to the
conflicts between developers and persons or companies prospecting
50. Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'don other.groundv, 390 U.S.
599 (1968).
51. 504 F.2d 448. SeeUnited States v. Thomas, 552 F.2d 871 (1977) (holders of grazing rights
succeeded in having the Department of the Interior invalidate Thomas' claims for lack of discovery
and, at that point, dynamited his location monuments and filed miningclaims of their own).
52. Metzger, The Coercive Utopians: Their Hidden Agenda, Denver Post, April 30, 1978, S B.
53. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-579, §209. Burdens the land
regulations and kills incentive to develop the land and its minerals as a human habitat.
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and mining under the mining laws. A portion of the statute reads as
follows:
(3) Before considering an application for conveyance of
mineral interests pursuant to this section (i) the Secretary shall require the deposit by the
applicant of a sum of money which he deems sufficient to
cover administrative costs including, but not limited to,
costs of conducting an exploratory program to determine
the character of the mineral deposits in the land,
evaluating the data obtained under the exploratory
program to determine the fair market value of the
mineral interests to be conveyed, and preparing andissuing the documents of conveyance: Provided, that, if
the administrative- costs exceed the deposit, the applicant
shall pay the outstanding amount; and, if the deposit
exceeds the administrative costs, the applicant shall be
given a credit for or refund of the excess; or
(ii) the applicant.., shall have conducted... such an
exploration program, in accordance with standards
5
promulgated by the Secretary.

4

The basic reality of this statute is that surface developers of
modest means do not have the money or time to undertake a
comprehensive mineral exploration program if, in fact, any surface
developer does. The statute still does not serve the cause of orderly
development of our natural resources, but it does achieve another
end - the proliferation of land agency power. Only the agency will
determine how extensive an exploration program must be, and it
would be unrealistic to believe that favored surface developers will
not have an easier time of it. There is no equality in the eyes of
administrative law.
Just as the larger mining companies have found ways to
accommodate the land agencies and administrative law, so they
will most likely survive this statute. But will the country's mineral
development be sufficiently provided by large mining companies
alone? Since large and successful mines have a stake in the scarcity
which keeps their prices up, a large mining company has a conflict
of interest with national mineral development. Future steps to
nationalization of the country's mines are not difficult footprints t6
discern. That will be the ultimate victory for administrative law.
54. Id.
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The "Authorization to Sell Reserved Mineral Interests to
Surface Owners" ignores two already existent solutions to the
conflicts in surface development with reserved mineral rights. The
land developer is, like any other citizen, free under the mining laws
to locate mining claims in good faith. He must do the required
annual assessment work thereafter, but such assessment work
provides for exploration and development work on a gradual and
continuing basis, 5 5 which is precluded by selling the mineral rights
at a point in time when an existent mineral value may be much
lower than the value future circumstances and developments could
realize. The second solution possible under present mining laws is a
withdrawal of the land from mineral entry: If the surface
development of public land is desirable, Congress has the power to
withdraw that piece of land from mineral entry.
But just as the courts have found it easier to entrust the mining
laws to land agencies, so the Congress puts up little resistance to
easing its responsibilities with regard to withdrawing public land
from mineral entry. The despotism of administrative law fills the
void at the expense of all the practicality inherent in American
mining law. Without the mining laws, which are our heritage, we
'will be without a true and tested system of mineral development.
Administrative law is already without representation from mineral
development people, without judicial control, and without the
immediate desire to develop minerals. Lacking these, the
liquidators of our mineral wealth can not truly concern themselves
with a better system. A triumph for the "rule of man" in the
Department of the Interior is no triumph for Man.

55. Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. §28 (1872): See eneral/y." MININGc RIGHTS ON THF P BiiC DOMS-IN,
supra, note 25, at 108-137.

